The reasoning in the madhhab for excepting death is that the Lawgiver commanded only that the deceased be washed.

It may be said in response: Likewise, the Lawgiver commanded that the deceased be washed and that one begin with the places of wudu.

If they say: Death is a state of ritual impurity that cannot be removed,

we reply: Yet, in your view, the effect achieved by washing the deceased is tantamount to the removal of ritual impurity, for we wash him and judge him to be purified, even though the state of ritual impurity requiring purification still remains. Thus, it is equivalent to the removal of ritual impurity.

We agree that death necessitates ghusl, but it does not necessitate wudu, because there is no explicit evidence that wudu is obligatory—although it is possible that wudu is obligatory, in light of his statement (peace and blessings be upon him): “and the places of wudu.” (1)

Thus, it appears that whatever necessitates ghusl necessitates only ghusl, since there is no evidence establishing the obligation of wudu . . .

Whoever is certain that he is in a state of purity but doubts whether he has entered a state of ritual impurity—or vice versa—proceeds on the basis of certainty, . . . . . . . . . . .

His statement, “Whoever is certain that he is in a state of purity but doubts whether he has entered a state of ritual impurity—or vice versa—proceeds on the basis of certainty,” means that if he is certain that he is in a state of purity but doubts whether he has entered a state of ritual impurity, he proceeds on the basis of certainty. This applies generally to matters that necessitate ghusl or wudu.

For example, a man performed wudu for the Maghrib prayer. Then, when the call to the Isha prayer was made and he rose to pray, he doubted whether his wudu had been nullified or not.

The basic presumption is that it has not been nullified, so he proceeds on the basis of certainty: namely, that he remains in a state of wudu.