His statement, “If it develops a defect, he must slaughter it, and it suffices for him,” excludes the case in which it develops the defect through his own action or negligence. For example, if it is a camel upon which he loads more than it can bear, and it then stumbles and breaks [its leg], then he must replace it with one like it or better. The same applies if this occurs through his negligence, such as leaving the udhiyah in a cold place on a wintry night, so that it is affected by the cold. In that case, he must replace it with one like it or better, because he was negligent; due to his negligence, he is liable.

His statement, “unless it had already become binding upon him as a liability before designation,” means that he must provide a replacement.

An example of this is a man who owes a tamattuʿ sacrificial animal. The sacrifice for tamattuʿ is binding upon him as a liability; it is not made binding merely by designation. As for a voluntary sacrificial animal, it does not become binding upon him unless he designates it, in which case he must slaughter it. The difference is that a duty binding as a liability before designation is required from a person in full. But an animal made binding by designation, whose basis was voluntary, is subject to the previously mentioned detail: he is not liable unless this occurred through his own action or negligence.

An example of what is binding as a liability before designation is that a man buys and designates a tamattuʿ sacrificial animal, then afterward it stumbles and breaks [its leg]. It is not sufficient for him to slaughter it while it is broken, because what had become binding upon him before designation was to slaughter a sacrificial animal free of defects. This animal has a defect, so he must replace it with one like it.

Issue: If he designates this as an udhiyah and it escapes, and he is unable to recover it, then if it had been binding before designation—for example, if he had vowed to offer an udhiyah—he must