The answer is that some scholars say it is pure but not purifying. (1) They hold that this change deprives it of its purifying quality. Thus, the reasoning is based on scholarly disagreement, and it is deemed disliked on account of this disagreement.

The correct view, however, is that reasoning on the basis of disagreement is unsound. For if we were to adopt it, we would deem many matters in the various fields of knowledge disliked, due to the abundance of disagreement over scholarly issues; and this is untenable.

Thus, disagreement is not a valid legal basis, nor is it acceptable to reason by saying, “in order to avoid disagreement,” for reasoning by avoiding disagreement is itself reasoning based on disagreement. Rather, we say: if this disagreement has some basis for consideration and the evidence can support it, then we deem it disliked—not because there is disagreement over it, but because the evidence can support it. This falls under the heading of: “Leave what causes you doubt for what does not cause you doubt.” (2)

But if the disagreement has no basis for consideration, then it is not possible for us to use it as a basis for legal rulings or derive a ruling from it.

Not every disagreement that arises is worthy of consideration; only a disagreement that has some basis for consideration is. (3)