for him to enter ihram on his behalf. The appointor must therefore bear the one thousand riyals, because the proxy spent it at his instruction before the period of his appointment had ended. Whatever is spent after that is the proxy’s responsibility if he continues the journey. But if he returns, the expenses of the return journey are borne by the appointor, because this proxy travelled from his town only for the appointor’s benefit. Thus, whatever expenses he incurred are borne by the appointor, and the difficulty is thereby resolved.

Suppose, however, that the proxy did not learn of the appointor’s recovery, continued on, and performed the Hajj. What is the ruling?

We say: this Hajj does not suffice on behalf of the appointor, but it counts as a voluntary Hajj for the proxy himself. The appointor is nevertheless liable for the fee he had agreed upon with the proxy, because the proxy was unaware. An agent’s actions before he learns that the agency has been revoked or terminated are valid and effective. For example, if you appoint someone to sell something for you, then dismiss him from the agency, but he does not learn of his dismissal until after he has acted, his action is valid on the basis of the original agency, which he did not know had been revoked.

His statement, “For it to be obligatory upon a woman,” refers to Hajj, and likewise to Umrah. That is, for it to be obligatory upon a woman, it is stipulated that there be “the presence of her mahram”; meaning, that a mahram be with her and agree to travel with her. It is not enough merely for a mahram to exist; rather, there must be a mahram who agrees to travel with her.

The author’s words indicate that the presence of a mahram is a condition for the obligation, because his presence falls within the ability which Allah has stipulated for Hajj to be obligatory. This inability—that is, the inability of a woman who has no