The second view is that this is not valid. However, if he intends it for himself and for the person being carried, it counts for himself but not for the person being carried, because he is the principal, while the person being carried is subsidiary.

What we hold in this matter is that if the child can form an intention, does so, and his guardian carries him, then the tawaf counts for both the guardian and the child, since once the child has formed the intention, it is as though he performed tawaf himself.

But if he is unable to form an intention, then tawaf cannot validly be performed with two intentions. His guardian should be told: either perform tawaf first yourself, and then perform tawaf with the child; or entrust the child’s matter to someone else to carry him in your place. If he performs tawaf with two intentions, then what we hold is that it counts for the carrier but not for the person being carried.

His statement, “Their performance by a child and a slave is voluntary”: even if the slave is sane and has reached puberty, his Hajj and ‘umrah can only be voluntary acts, because he is not legally qualified for an obligatory Hajj or ‘umrah. The disagreement on this has preceded: is freedom a condition for validity in discharge of the obligation in all cases? Or should an exception be made when his master permits him—such that, if his master grants him permission, it becomes obligatory upon him and discharges his obligation? As mentioned previously.

Accordingly, it becomes clear that the five conditions mentioned by the author fall into three categories:

First: two conditions for obligation, validity, and discharge of the obligation: Islam and sanity.

Second: two conditions for obligation and discharge of the obligation only: puberty and freedom.