- The hadith of Ibn Abbas, may Allah be pleased with them both: A woman said, “O Messenger of Allah, the obligation of Hajj which Allah has prescribed for His servants has become due upon my father while he is an elderly man, unable to remain seated on a riding mount. Should I perform Hajj on his behalf?” He said, “Yes.” (1) Thus, if proxy performance is permissible on behalf of a living person because of his inability to perform Hajj, then it is even more so on behalf of one who has died.
His statement, “or vowed i'tikaf,” is read without tanwin, for the reason previously mentioned; that is, i'tikaf undertaken by vow.
An example is a man who vows to observe i'tikaf for three days at the beginning of Jumada al-Akhirah, but does not observe it and then dies. His guardian should observe i'tikaf on his behalf, because this i'tikaf has become a debt binding upon him; and if it is a debt, it must be discharged, just as a debt owed to another person is discharged.
The phrase “vowed i'tikaf” may suggest that there is an i'tikaf that is obligatory by virtue of the Sacred Law itself, but this is not so, for i'tikaf becomes obligatory only through a vow.
His statement, “or a vowed prayer, which it is recommended for his guardian to make up,” means that if a person dies owing a vowed prayer—for example, a man vows to pray two rak'ahs for Allah, then the time passes without his praying them, and he subsequently dies—it is recommended for his guardian to pray on his behalf. This vow has become a debt binding upon him, and a debt is discharged just as a debt owed to another person is discharged. However, if it is an obligation prescribed by the Sacred Law itself, it is not made up on his behalf, because no such report has been transmitted.
If someone were to say: The basic principle concerning acts of worship is that analogy is not applied to them, so how