then his guardian should make it up on his behalf—not by analogy, but on the basis of the explicit text, namely the hadith of Aishah, may Allah be pleased with her: “Whoever dies while fasting remains due from him, his guardian should fast on his behalf.” (1)

The word “fasting” is an indefinite term, unrestricted to any particular type of fast. Moreover, how can it be claimed that it refers to a vowed fast, when vowed fasting is rare in comparison with obligatory fasting? A person may die without ever having vowed to fast even a single day, whereas it is common for someone to die while Ramadan fasting remains due from him. So how can the indication of the hadith be diverted from what is prevalent and applied to what is rare? This is not a sound way of dealing with the evidence. Rather, the evidence is to be understood according to what is most common and prevalent. In the majority of cases of those who die while fasting remains due from them, it is Ramadan fasting, an expiatory fast, or something similar.

They say that the hadith concerning the woman qualifies the hadith of Aishah. In response, it is said: mentioning one instance of a general ruling with a ruling that accords with the general sense does not constitute specification; rather, it is an application that clarifies the generality. Thus, the general wording in Aishah’s hadith—“Whoever dies while fasting remains due from him”—includes every type of obligatory fast. This is the correct view, and it is the position of al-Shafi‘i and the adherents of the literalist school.

But who is the person for whom making up the fast becomes obligatory after he dies?

The answer is: the one who had the opportunity to make it up but did not do so. If he then dies, we say to his guardian: Fast on his behalf, in accordance with the Prophet’s saying: “Whoever dies while fasting remains due from him, his guardian should fast on his behalf.”

The guardian is the heir. The evidence is the Prophet’s saying: “Give