However, the scholars of the school say that this is religious information, in which men and women are equal, just as men and women are equal in transmitting reports; and transmission is religious information. Hence, they did not stipulate that the sighting of the Ramadan crescent must be established before a judge, nor did they require the formal wording of testimony. Rather, they said that if a person hears a trustworthy individual informing people in a gathering that he has seen the crescent, he is obliged to fast on the basis of that report.

His statement: “If they fasted for thirty days on the testimony of one person, but the crescent was not seen; or if they fasted because of clouds, they must not end the fast.” “If they fasted,” meaning the people, “on the testimony of one person,” meaning concerning the beginning of Ramadan, and they do not see the crescent of Shawwal, then they must not end the fast; rather, they fast for thirty-one days. This is because the end of the month is not established except by the testimony of two men. Here, the fast was based on the testimony of one man, so it rests upon evidence that does not establish the end of the month. If they were to end the fast, they would be acting on the testimony of one person, whereas this is not valid for ending the fast. This is the well-known position of the school (1).

Some scholars said instead: if they have fasted thirty days on the testimony of one person, they must end the fast, because ending the fast follows the beginning of the fast and is based upon it. The fast was established by legal evidence, and they have fasted thirty days; moreover, it is not possible for a month to exceed thirty days. Or it may be said that they must end the fast as a consequence of having begun it, because what cannot be established independently may be established consequentially. This view is correct.