and require that they be treated differently, whether or not we know those distinguishing factors. Whoever supposes a distinction where the Lawgiver has joined two matters together, or a similarity where He has differentiated between them, is undoubtedly mistaken, for the Sacred Law has come from One Who is All-Wise, All-Aware.
Second: Zakah is not due on clothing in the first place. Thus, its obligation or exemption does not depend on one’s intention; rather, the ruling concerning it is one and the same: zakah is not obligatory on it. Accordingly, analogy would require jewelry to have a single ruling as well—namely, that zakah is obligatory on it, whether it is prepared for wearing or for some other purpose—just as clothing has a single ruling, namely that no zakah is due on it, whether it is prepared for wearing or otherwise. This is not contradicted by the obligation of zakah on clothing when it constitutes trade goods, for in that case zakah is due on its value.
Third: It may be asked: What type of analogy is intended in equating jewelry prepared for use with clothing prepared for use? Is it an analogy of equivalence or a reverse analogy?
If it is said: It is an analogy of equivalence,
it may be answered: This would only be valid if zakah were due on clothing before it was prepared for wearing and use, and then ceased to be due after it was so prepared, so that the subsidiary case and the original case would be equal in their ruling. If it is said: It is a reverse analogy, it may be answered: This would only be valid if zakah were not due on clothing when it was not prepared for wearing, but became due when it was prepared for wearing. For this is the reverse of the ruling concerning jewelry, according to those who differentiate between jewelry prepared for wearing and that prepared for other purposes (1).