The author thus restricts the phrase “in the cause of Allah” to volunteer fighters who are not registered on the military payroll—that is, who receive nothing from the public treasury for their fighting. This is the established position of the school of law. In doing so, he restricts the verse in three respects:

First: he confines “in the cause of Allah” to jihad alone.

Second: he confines it to the fighters alone.

Third: he confines it to volunteer fighters who are not registered on the military payroll.

As for restricting it to jihad in the cause of Allah, there is no doubt about this, contrary to those who say that “in the cause of Allah” means every righteous and charitable deed. According to this interpretation, it includes everything intended for Allah’s sake: building mosques, repairing roads, constructing schools, printing books, and other deeds that draw one nearer to Allah. For the righteous deeds that lead to Allah are beyond enumeration.

However, this view is weak. If we interpreted the verse in this manner, the restriction would have no benefit whatsoever. The restrictive wording is: “Charitable offerings are only for the poor...” [al-Tawbah 9:60]. This is a linguistic consideration.

As for the substantive consideration, if we made the verse general to include everything that draws one nearer to Allah, then those known with certainty to be entitled to zakah would be deprived of it. For when people know that their zakah is valid if it is used to build a mosque, they will hasten to do so because its benefit endures until the Day of Resurrection.

The correct view, then, is that it is specific to jihad in the cause of Allah.