then the owner of the property would not be permitted, once zakah had become due upon it, to dispose of it. But this is contrary to the actual state of affairs, since one from whom zakah is due may dispose of his property—even after zakah has become due upon it—though he remains liable for the zakah.

If we say that it is an obligation owed by the person, then zakah remains due even if the property is destroyed after it becomes obligatory, without any transgression or negligence on his part. This view, too, is problematic.

The view adopted by the author combines both meanings: zakah is due upon the property itself, while also being an obligation upon the person. The individual is accountable for it as a personal liability, and it is due upon the property; were it not for the property, zakah would not be obligatory. Thus, it is due upon the property itself.

One issue is excluded from this, however: trade goods. Zakah is not due upon the goods themselves, but upon their value. Therefore, if one pays the zakah on trade goods from the goods themselves, it is not valid; rather, he must pay it according to their value.

Thus, when a shopkeeper’s zakah year is complete, if he says, “I have sugar, tea, and clothing. I shall pay the zakah on the sugar from the sugar, on the tea from the tea, and on the clothing from the clothing,” we say to him: You must pay it based on their value. Assess the goods you possess and pay one fortieth of their value, for this is more beneficial to the poor. Moreover, your merchandise has not remained the same from the beginning of the year to its end: you may, for example, exchange sugar for rice, wheat, or something else. This differs from grazing livestock, which remains from the beginning of the zakah year to its end, and whose zakah is paid from the animals themselves.

The correct view, therefore, is that zakah on trade goods is only valid when paid according to their value.