in it. As for the opening supplication, it has not been reported from the Prophet, may Allah’s peace and blessings be upon him, that he would recite it at the beginning of the funeral prayer.
“Indeed, You know our return and our final abode, and You are able to do all things . . .”
His statement, “Indeed, You know our return and our final abode,” explains what came before; that is, we have called upon You with this supplication because we know that You know our return—that is, what we shall return to—and our final abode—that is, what we shall ultimately come to. For mathwā (final abode) and maṣīr (ultimate destination) have the same meaning.
His statement, “And You are able to do all things,” completes the supplication. However, it is one of the additions made by some jurists, since it has not been reported in the hadith narrated from the Prophet, may Allah’s peace and blessings be upon him.
Its meaning is that Allah has power over all things: He is able to bring into existence what does not exist, to cause what exists to cease to exist, and to change a condition from good to better, or from good to worse. This is a general statement from which nothing is excluded.
The author of Tafsīr al-Jalālayn, commenting on the words of Allah, Most High, in Surah al-Ma’idah,
“To Allah belongs the dominion of the heavens and the earth and all that is within them, and He is over all things competent.” [al-Ma’idah]
said: “The intellect excludes His Essence; thus, He has no power over it.” This statement is objectionable. As for his saying, “The intellect excludes His Essence,” we say: Where is this intellect that has excluded His Essence by claiming that He has no power over it? Does Allah not do whatever He wills?
The One who does whatever He wills acts of His own accord. Thus, He is able to do whatever He wills and to refrain from whatever He wills.
Yes, that which does not befit His Majesty cannot be an object of divine power, because the very nature of power does not relate to it. For example, if someone were to ask: “Is Allah able to create one like Himself?”
We say: This is impossible, because the existence of anything like Him is impossible. For if there were no reason for the impossibility of likeness other than