Whatever is mentioned without being defined by the Sacred Law—such as a place of safekeeping—is to be determined by customary practice. (1)

The poet’s words, “such as a place of safekeeping,” mean a place in which property is kept secure. For example, if you entrust me with an item and I place it in an unsecured location, and it is stolen, I am liable for it. If people would say, “This man was negligent in placing the money in this location,” then it is not a secure place, and he is liable. [What tells us whether a place is secure or unsecured is customary practice.]

In the case of theft as well, one of the conditions for the prescribed punishment of amputation is that the property be taken from a secure place. If it is stolen from an unsecured place, there is no amputation, because the owner of the property was negligent.

For example, someone leaves coins by the door of his shop and forgets to bring them inside. Then a man comes at night and steals them; his hand is not to be amputated, because they were not kept in a secure place.

Likewise, if he leaves them inside the house, on top of a chest, without putting them away, while the house door is habitually left open, and they are stolen, then he has been negligent—especially when security is weak. What counts as a secure place differs according to the level of security: the authorities may be weak, emboldening thieves; or they may be strong, deterring people.

Here, the author leaves undefined what counts as being near the built-up area; and when something is left undefined, it is referred back to customary practice. Thus, if the people of a village, for example, go ten kilometres away and hold the Jumu‘ah prayer, this is far away and cannot be attributed to the town. But if they hold it at the edge of the built-up area, everyone knows that these are the people of the town.

Some scholars say that the Jumu‘ah prayer may not be held except within the built-up area.