then if it spreads beyond its usual area, stones alone are not sufficient; only water will suffice. There is no textual evidence for this condition; rather, it is based on reasoning: limiting oneself to stones and the like in removing urine or feces is an exception to analogous cases, so it must be restricted to what is customary. Anything beyond the customary area is, in principle, to be removed with water.

The apparent meaning of the author’s words is that istijmār (cleansing oneself with stones) suffices when the discharge has not spread beyond its usual area, whereas if it has spread beyond that area, water is indispensable.

Some of Ahmad’s companions said: “If it spreads beyond the area of evacuation, then nothing but water is permissible for all of it.” (1) This is because, when the condition is not fully met, the whole act is invalid.

If someone were to say that what spreads far beyond its usual area—for example, urine spreading over one’s thigh—can only be cleansed with water, since it is neither the place from which the discharge exits nor near to it, whereas what is close to it may be excused, then perhaps this would not conflict with the statements of the jurists.

For istijmār with stones and the like, it is a condition that they be pure, .......

His statement, “For istijmār with stones and the like, it is a condition”: stones is the plural of stone.

“And the like”: such as dried clods of earth—that is, dry, hardened mud—dust, rags, paper, and similar things, such as wood.

His statement, “that they be pure,” means that they must be neither intrinsically impure nor contaminated by impurity. The difference is that something intrinsically impure is impure in itself, whereas something contaminated by impurity is rendered impure by something else—that is,