the element that is excepted (1); thus the purport is to declare lawful (2) every sale that is not ribā. Consequently, unless it is first proved that a given transaction is free of ribā, it cannot be admitted among the lawful sales, and this blocks the claim of absolute generality. And should ribā itself be a generic term, it is nonetheless excluded from the word “sale” as well; the word “sale” then becomes particularized, so an unrestricted claim of generality cannot stand with respect to it (3).

Ibn al-Murahhil remarked: “This is a case of specification (takhsīs). Here we have two general statements that conflict, not a case of (4) exception, for the recognized formulas of exception are well known. Since it is specification, the claim of generality is not precluded.”

Shaykh Taqī al-Dīn replied: “This is one continuous statement, falling under the heading of connected specification (takhsīs muttasil) which the jurists term ‘exception.’ It is like saying, ‘He may have this house, while I shall have this particular room,’ which is tantamount (5) to saying, ‘except this room.’ Likewise, if one were to say, ‘Show honor to these people, but do not honor so-and-so,’ when so-and-so is one of them, it is the same as saying, ‘except so-and-so.’ In precisely this manner it is as though the verse reads, ‘Allah has permitted trade (6) except that part of it which is ribā.’ Whoever, after this, still maintains that the verse is general for everything that can be called a sale is mistaken.”

Ibn al-Murahhil responded: “I concede that it is general only with respect to every sale that is not called ribā.”