In sum, that ḥubb (love) and bughḍ (hate) are positive, real attributes is self-evident; no dispute on the matter is admissible, and anyone who contests it is to be debated only in the fashion reserved for sophists.

I say: Since love, hate, and the like—attributes that are relational and directed toward another—are genuine existential attributes, and since the distinction is now clear between attributes that are nothing but relation and attribution and those that are positive in themselves yet involve relation, ḥamd (praise) and shukr (gratitude) belong to the second class. Ḥamd is an existent reality that pertains to the act or quality for which one is praised, and shukr is likewise an existent reality that pertains to the benefit for which one is thanked. Their essence cannot be grasped without understanding the affirmative attribute they possess that is oriented toward another, and that attribute forms part of their very reality.

Thus, if the object of one of the two is broader(1) than the object of the other, and that linkage is only(2) an accidental concomitant of a positive attribute common to both, then that positive attribute must be mentioned when their realities are defined.

The proof for this is that whoever does not understand iḥsān (beneficence) cannot possibly understand shukr; it is therefore evident that conceiving the object of gratitude is included within conceiving gratitude itself.

I add: Even were someone to claim that this relational element is merely privative, then—whenever a reality is composed of existence and non-existence—both components must be included in its definition. Likewise, whoever defines “father” insofar as he is a father must apprehend fatherhood, which is a relation and attribution, even though the father himself is an existent entity.

Hence ḥamd and shukr are connected to the act for which one is praised and the act for which one is thanked, even if