it be intended exclusively for the unbeliever, and the term remains univocal so long as the sign of this exclusivity is not the word “munāfiq” (hypocrite) itself but rather the definite article.

This noble inquiry (1) extends to every general word that is employed for only one of its species—either because predominant usage has narrowed it, or because a verbal indicator confines it to that species, such as the definiteness produced by annexation (idāfa) or by the definite article. When the restriction stems from predominant usage, it is correct to say that the word is homonymous (2); but if it results from a verbal indicator, the word retains its original univocity.

Accordingly, it is sound to say that nifāq (3) is a generic term under which two kinds fall, for the word is, in origin, general and univocal. It is likewise sound to say that it is a homonym shared between the nifāq (4) that nullifies one’s foundational faith and the broader, non-annulling nifāq found within the religion, because in customary legal usage the term has come to be used predominantly for the hypocrisy of disbelief.