An illustration of this is the generic term which, through customary usage, comes to be predominantly associated with one of its species. Take the word dābbah (beast): when it is chiefly understood to mean “horse,” we may apply it to the horse with regard to the element it shares (1) with all other beasts, and then the predication is univocal. We may also apply it (2) with reference to what is peculiar to the horse, in which case the term is shared between the specific sense of “horse” and the general sense covering all beasts; accordingly, its use for the horse is sometimes univocal (3) and sometimes equivocal.
The same holds when a generic name prevails over a single individual and, by virtue of that prevalence, functions as a proper noun—such as Ibn ʿUmar (4) or al-Najm (the star). We may utter it of him with regard to the element he shares with all other stars and with every son of ʿUmar; this utterance is univocal. We may likewise apply it (5) with reference to the distinguishing trait that sets him apart from other stars or from the other sons of ʿUmar; then the usage is equivocal, shared between this personal meaning and the generic meaning.
Thus every general name that has come to be closely linked with one of its individuals may still be employed for that individual according to the primary, all-inclusive coinage—and that is a univocal usage; or it may be employed according to the secondary coinage (6), in which case it becomes equivocal.
The term nifāq (hypocrisy) belongs to this very category, for in the Sacred Law it signifies the outward display of religion while concealing