the unremovable arbiter of the Sacred Law (1) and the purified, duly accredited witness of reason.
In sum [ق 15], such discussions rarely contained unmixed falsehood or sheer monstrosity (2); they invariably offered at least a whiff of truth and retained some recognized benefit.
Later on, however, a number of would-be scholars from the lands of Persia and Byzantium became infatuated (3) with a brand of specious dialectic invented by a group of Easterners (4). They grafted it onto usul al-fiqh, the principles of jurisprudence, dodging within it like foxes (5) and swerving from the broad, sunlit path. They decked it out with expressions drawn from the speech of genuine scholars—phrases those scholars had indeed uttered—yet they transplanted them into contexts unworthy of them. They stitched together proofs in a crooked fashion and exchanged fruitful composition for barren construction.
By padding their discourse with verbosity, resorting to far-fetched allusion, employing equivocal and figurative terms in their premises, treating probabilistic matters as definitive (6), and citing general proofs where they carry no import (7)—all in a way that necessarily fuses stark contradictions and sinks into logical impossibility and prolixity—they did nothing but imitate a sophist or (8)